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Gene drives are genetic elements that skew the patterns 
of inheritance, thereby accelerating the spread of a given 
characteristic. Over 15 to 20 generations, gene drives could 
spread a characteristic through an entire population, even 
if the characteristic, itself, is harmful to its carriers.1 Natu-
rally occurring DNA elements with gene drive-like proper-
ties have been known for decades.1–3 However, it was the 
application of the CRISPR/Cas9 system4 that made it easier, 
faster and more precise to edit a genome that enabled a new 
generation of synthetic gene drives (Box 1). If successfully 
developed and applied, these types of gene drives have the 
potential to alter, reduce, or even – according to some re-
searchers – eliminate a population in the environment. This 
novel form of population control and modification could be 
applied in fields as diverse as human and animal health, con-
servation biology, and agriculture.
So far, CRISPR-based synthetic gene drives have been de-
veloped – with varying success – in a handful of species, 
including fruit flies,5 mosquitoes,6–8 and yeasts.9,10 To date, 
synthetic gene drives have only been tested in the labora-
tory, and therefore our current knowledge of how they are 
expected to behave in natural systems relies primarily on 
theoretical models. There currently exist no immediate plans 
for their release into the environment.
Gene drives are genetic elements that skew the pattern of inheritance of a given characteristic in sexually reproduc-
ing organisms. They can be used to spread a characteristic that can alter or even reduce the numbers of individuals 
in wild populations of a certain species. As they spread by being inherited from one generation to the next, they 
could persist in populations long-term. The spreading property of gene drives could be a source of great potential in 
areas as diverse as the control of disease vectors, invasive species, agricultural pests and predators of endangered 
species. However, the same property may make containment challenging and therefore may also pose novel envi-
ronmental risks. The evaluation, distribution of risks and benefits and the fact that gene drives may be seen as a 
particularly profound interference with nature raises further novel ethical considerations.
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Outcome 2: the spread of the gene drive slows down over 
time. The ends of the two chromosome pieces rejoin, intro-
ducing small changes to the cut site. The CRISPR system 
may no longer recognise the target site and the gene drive 
element will not be copied onto the second chromosome. 
This may lead to “resistance” to the particular gene drive. As 
resistance becomes more frequent, the gene drive's spread 
through the population is slowed down.
Outcome 1: the gene drive spreads. The gene drive-con-
taining chromosome is used as a template and the 
modification is copied into the target site on the second 
chromosome. The cell now has two copies of the gene drive 
and the modification. These can act as a template for the 
next generation, leading to a spread of the modification in 
the population.
3. The cell repairs the damaged DNA in one of two ways:
wild, non-modified chromosome
gene drive chromosome
In sexual reproduction, an individual inherits one chromosome from each parent. Therefore, when a gene drive individual 
mates with a wild, unmodified individual:
1. The resulting progeny inherits one chromosome with the 
gene drive from the gene drive parent and one non-mod-
ified chromosome from the wild-type parent. 
2. The CRISPR system acts as a “molecular scissors”, cut-
ting the wild-type chromosome at the target site where 
the modification is to be introduced.
Under gene drive inheritance
When an individual containing a gene drive mates with a 
wild one, nearly 100% of the offspring inherit the modified 
gene. As a result, within a few generations, nearly all indi-
viduals carry the gene drive and the desired characteristic, 
unless resistance arises.
Under normal genetic inheritance
In sexually reproducing organisms, offspring have a 50:50 
chance of inheriting a specific genetic variant from each 
parent.
What are gene drives?
Gene drives are genetic elements that skew the pattern of inheritance of a characteristic.
How do CRISPR-based gene drives work?
FIGURE 1
BOX 1
What affects the spread of a gene drive?
Several factors affect the spread of the gene drive in relation 
to the biology of the species or the environment, such as:
 • Sexual versus asexual reproduction. Gene drives only work 
in sexually reproducing species. Therefore, they cannot be 
developed for use in viruses, bacteria and some plants.11
 • The generation time is important in determining the spread 
of the gene drive. Therefore, species with short reproduc-
tive cycles, such as insects, are better suited to spread 
gene drives than more long-lived species, such as larger 
mammals.
 • The evolutionary cost of the gene drive: if it affects the sur-
vival or fertility of the individual and there is also high re-
sistance, it is less likely to spread through the population.2
 • The social system of the species. Some species, e.g. ro-
dents, live in close-knit social structures. Preferential 
mating with members of their social group could act as a 
barrier to the mating success of introduced, unrelated indi-
viduals containing the gene drive element.12
 • Geographic barriers that may restrict the spread of gene 
drive elements across wider areas, e.g., restricting them to 
islands.11
In addition, resistance is considered to be one of the ma-
jor barriers to the successful spread of a gene drive.13 Re-
sistance may be naturally occurring, or may arise when DNA 
is repaired by end-joining (Outcome 2, Figure 1). It has been 
observed to occur in most gene drive systems within a few 
generations6,7 with the exception of a recent lab study on 
Anopheles gambiae, the major vector of human malaria in 
sub-Saharan Africa.8 On the other hand, resistance could also 
act as a safeguard, making a gene drive more controllable 
and limiting the risk of species elimination.13
Finally, researchers are further developing ways to encode 
specific properties into the CRISPR-based gene drives that 
would limit their spread to make them safer. These include 
population-specific gene drives,11 drives that work for a limi-
ted time period,14 drives that only spread if enough indivi-
duals carrying the gene drive are released,15 and drives that 
reverse the effect of an existing gene drive.1
Self-propagating spread of gene drives: 
potential benefits, risks and ethical  
considerations
Like conventional biocontrol agents, gene drive organisms 
have the ability to establish themselves in the environment 
and spread.16,17 What makes this technology different is that 
this spreading propensity is encoded into the genetic archi-
tecture of the system. This characteristic is one of the sources 
of greatest potential of this technology in diverse areas, rang-
ing from human and animal health to nature conservation 
and agriculture11 (Figure 2). At the same time, it also raises 
important ethical issues, in particular because it is difficult 
to ensure the containment of gene drive organisms and be-
cause there are risks associated with their spread.
Potential benefits
The self-propagating nature of gene drives could result in 
possible benefits,12 such as:
 • Potentially higher efficiency at suppressing/altering target 
populations than conventional methods.
 • More long-lasting than conventional methods, as the gene 
drive could continue to spread through multiple genera-
tions without having to be actively re-introduced.
 • Greater accessibility. Due to the self-perpetuating spread 
intrinsic to the system, no particular infrastructure is need-
ed to ensure spatial spread, although monitoring the ef-
fect of the intervention would be required. This means that 
gene drives could reach areas that are only served by lim-
ited infrastructure.
 • Ease of application. The release and spread of gene drive 
organisms does not require a change in people's behav-
iour, but is a property of the system itself.
 • Possibility to introduce and spread modifications specific 
to a species or even a population.11 This could reduce un-
desired effects on non-target organisms compared to con-
ventional methods such as biocides.
Potential risks
The self-propagating nature of gene drives, however, also 
poses specific risks, including:
• Increased challenges in containment over conventional 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs). This is a possible 
risk if gene drive organisms escape unintentionally into the 
environment and breed with local individuals during the 
research and development phase.
• Difficulties in preventing gene drive organisms from 
spreading into non-target populations of the same species 
and sexually compatible (sub-)species.18
Not to be confused:  
genome editing and gene drives
Gene drives are sometimes confused with genome 
editing technology more broadly, in particular the  
CRISPR/Cas9 technique. Genome editing technologies, 
in general, allow the targeted modification of an orga-
nism’s genome. Synthetic gene drive systems are just 
one of the many applications of genome editing. The 
term “synthetic” indicates that gene drives are created 
using gene technology methods, as opposed to natu-
rally occurring gene drives. Whereas synthetic gene dri-
ves have only been developed in a handful of species, 
genome editing techniques have been successfully ap-
plied to modify the genome of a much broader range 
of species, such as viruses, bacteria, fungi, plants, and 
some animals, including humans. There are also a wider 
range of applications for genome editing, such as plant 
and animal breeding or gene therapy.
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BOX 2
• The risk that gene drives are difficult and perhaps impos-
sible to stop if unexpected effects are observed during the 
application phase.
• The potential to spread across national borders, which 
could result in international regulatory incidents.
As with other interventions and technologies, there exist 
more general risks that are currently being discussed. These 
include potential negative ecological effects that are hard to 
predict due to the complexity of the systems and the poten-
tial for misuse.19
Ethical considerations
The idea of humans redesigning both the genome of orga-
nisms and its patterns of inheritance – with potentially irre-
versible consequences – may be seen by many as a parti-
cularly profound and ethically problematic interference with 
nature (e.g., explored in the context of synthetic biology20). 
For others, the use of gene drives may be perceived as a 
continuation of the technological activities of human socie-
ties since the dawn of agriculture. Most ethical questions re-
late more directly to the balance of risks and benefits as well 
as their fair distribution amongst the stakeholders involved. 
Many of these considerations play a role when it comes to 
the implementation of regulatory and governance schemes 
(Box 2). For instance:
• Do we as a society first need to discuss moral accepta-
bility issues, for example the intrinsic value of a species, 
prior to weighing up the risks against the opportunities?21
• As with other technological issues, should the technology 
as such or its specific applications be evaluated, assessed, 
discussed and regulated?
• What approaches to risk and technology assessment 
should be applied?
• Should the application be judged against the risks and 
benefits of alternative interventions as well as against the 
option of no intervention at all?22
• Is a “step-by-step” risk assessment testing approach fea-
sible, given difficulties in environmental containment and 
the uncertainties with respect to how gene drives will work 
in the wild and what impact they will have on natural sys-
tems? Could drawing from past experiences, such as the 
release of sterile insects or biocontrol agents, be helpful?
• Are there situations of urgency in which it is considered 
unjustified not to implement a gene drive solution? If so, 
what would those scenarios be and who should define 
them?21
• How can fair access to the technology and its applications 
be ensured?
• How would the risks and benefits be shared between the 
developers and communities that could be affected by the 
outcomes?
• How could we ensure that the development of a technol-
ogy-based solution does not detract resources from alter-
native solutions?21
The legislative landscape
How gene drive research and potential release should 
be regulated and governed is under discussion inter - 
nationally.
How are gene drives regulated in Switzerland?
Organisms with synthetic gene drives are GMOs and 
therefore fall under GMO legislation, both nationally 
(e.g., Gene Technology Act, Containment Ordinance and 
Release Ordinance) and internationally (in particular 
the United Nations Convention for Biological Diversity 
[CBD]).
Would research on synthetic gene drives be allowed in 
Switzerland?
In the lab: Yes.
According to current Swiss legislation, research with 
novel gene drive organisms must take place in con-
tained laboratories, as is the case for any other novel 
GMO. It would not automatically be assigned into a cer-
tain risk class. Instead, the risks would be assessed for 
each organism and characteristic individually on the ba-
sis of defined criteria, and appropriate safety measures 
would be defined. Research also requires notification or 
authorisation under the Containment Ordinance.
In the field: Unlikely.
In Switzerland, according to the Release Ordinance 
(Art. 7, 1b) “The handling of genetically modified organ-
isms in the environment must be carried out in such a  
manner that [...] the genetically modified organisms 
cannot spread or multiply in an uncontrolled way in the 
environment”.
Is the release of gene drives on the market allowed in 
Switzerland? At the moment, no.
In Switzerland, a GMO can only be put into circula-
tion after both laboratory and field trials have been  
conducted and an authorisation has been granted. 
Among others, these trials have to show that neither the 
GMO nor its traits can spread in an undesired way, and 
that it does not severely or permanently harm important 
ecosystem functions (Gene Technology Act Art. 6, 3).
What international regulations do gene drives come 
under?
Internationally, the handling, transport and safe use of 
GMOs is primarily regulated by the Cartagena Protocol 
of the CBD. It calls upon member states to protect bi-
ological diversity from adverse effects of GMOs, taking 
also into account risks for human health. GMOs intend-
ed to be released into the environment may only be 
exported into another country with the prior consent of 
that country. Member states are obliged to take appro-
priate measures to prevent the unintentional spread of 
GMOs across national borders. The rules on liability and 
redress in cases of damage are specified in a supple-
mentary protocol. It should be noted that several coun-
tries have not signed the Cartagena Protocol, including 
the USA, Canada and Australia.
Reduction of malaria
 • Malaria is caused by Plasmodium parasites and transmitted by 
female Anopheles mosquitoes.
 • 400 000 deaths/year, mainly young children.24
Current strategy and problems
 • Combination of vector control (e.g. insecticide-treated bed nets, 
sprays) and medicines.
 • Insecticide and drug resistance, limited coverage, lack of 
adequate health infrastructure, and costs pose a challenge to 
malaria eradication.24
State of gene drive technology
 • Natural gene drive systems (e.g Wolbachia bacteria) have been 
previously used to control the transmission of the Dengue 
virus.25
 • Two laboratory proof-of-concepts of synthetic gene drives:  
i) suppressing Anopheles gambiae,7 and
ii) making A. stephensi resistant to Plasmodium.6
 • Resistance to the gene drive is a challenge; though in a recent 
study, resistance did not occur before the laboratory study 
populations collapsed entirely in 8 and 12 generations.8
 • The Target Malaria project26 works to develop, assess risks and 
engage local communities for a gene drive solution in Africa.
Potential benefits
 • Fast acting: models predict less than five years to transform a 
population.27
 • Low cost once developed: if gene drive is efficient, there is less 
need for re-release.16
 • Specific against a single species or population,11 reducing 
effects on non-target insect species currently affected by 
non-specific insecticides; however, as malaria is often transmit-
ted by several Anopheles species, targeting only one might not 
always effectively reduce transmission.
 • Increased coverage: gene drive individuals can disperse and 
thus access remote areas, complementing other strategies.28
Potential risks
 • Unintended spill-over into other closely related Anopheles 
species.
 • Strategies aiming to inhibit the Plasmodium parasite can be 
overcome if Plasmodium evolves resistance, potentially altering 
the parasite's behavior.16
 • Hard-to-predict ecological effects of mosquito suppression; 
however, A. gambiae elimination is unlikely to have cascading 
effects on the entire ecosystem.12
 • Potentially irreversible: once released, a gene drive could be 
difficult or even impossible to recall.
Other important considerations
 • When is an intervention that alters, reduces, or eliminates a 
species morally justified?
 • When could it be a matter of moral obligation to implement 
such a solution?21
 • How can one effectively engage with local communities to 
reach a decision?
 • How does the use of gene drives compare ethically to other 
means of population control, e.g. insecticide use?
Agriculture
Gene drives have been suggested as an alternative to in-
secticides and netting to control agricultural pests such 
as the rapidly expanding Drosophila suzukii, the spotted 
wing Drosophila,30 a major threat to soft fruit production 
both in Switzerland and worldwide.31,32
Conservation
Gene drives have been proposed as an alternative to poi-
soning and live-trapping for the control of invasive spe-
cies such as rodents on islands (e.g. Predator Free 2050 
program in New Zealand29).
Human health
Approximately one out of six human diseases is transmit-
ted by insect vectors.23 Gene drives have been proposed 
as a complementary approach to insecticides and other 
intervention strategies to reduce disease-transmitting in-
sects (e.g. mosquitoes, tsetse flies, ticks) and to alleviate 
the global burden of vector-borne diseases (e.g. malaria, 
Dengue, Zika and Yellow fever, Lyme disease6,7).
Possible future applications of gene drives
FIGURE 2
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In Switzerland, there is currently no ongoing research 
on synthetic gene drives; internationally, research pro-
gresses and the possibility of controlled field trials is 
being discussed.33 Drawing from previous experiences 
with related technologies that share some properties 
with gene drives, such as the release of biological con-
trol agents, sterile insect technique, transgenic insects, 
or Wolbachia-based gene drive organisms, may help us 
to respond to some of the future regulatory challenges 
of synthetic gene drives.34 Due to the novelties of gene 
drives, a technology assessment approach that incorpo-
rates societal needs and values is crucial. As a society, 
we will need to consider the potential benefits, risks and 
the ethical implications, including how risks and bene-
fits are shared between the developers of the technology 
and the communities that are affected by the outcomes. 
These will depend on the species, the targeted charac-
teristics, the intended applications, and the existence of 
viable alternatives. An open and transparent dialogue 
with all stakeholders, including researchers, industry, lo-
cal communities, NGOs, governmental and international 
authorities, and regulatory bodies, is required to address 
these questions. For society as a whole, such a dialogue 
is essential to decide whether gene drives can and should 
help to solve the growing problems that we are facing in 
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